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Editors' Introduction
Sophisticated statistical evidence became important in the litigation over
the constitutionality of the death penalty a decade ago. As part of its
attack on capital punishment, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund sponsored a statistical study of racial discrimination in the
sentences imposed for rape in the South.' Abolitionist lawyers have relied
on evidence of discriminatory imposition of the penalty to argue that it
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection
of the laws and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. 2 Such evidence clearly influenced the decision in Furman v.
Georgia, in which the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four margin, struck
down as cruel and unusual punishment the imposition of the penalty at
the discretion of the judge or jury.3
A more fundamental statistical attack was directed at one of the under-
lying legislative rationales for capital punishment-that it is a more ef-
fective deterrent to crime than life imprisonment. This attack goes to the
very existence of the penalty rather than the manner in which it is imposed.
The issue of deterrence received some attention in Furman, and is now be-
fore the Court in Fowler v. North Carolina,4 which poses Eighth and Four-
1. The findings of this study arc reported in Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the
Death Sentence for Rape, in AV. BowERs, ExEcuTIONS IN AMERICA 114-20 (1974). This
study confirmed evidence of the discriminatory imposition of the penalty reported in
earlier investigations. See IV. BOWERS, supra at 18-19.
2. Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae at 13-22, Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813
(1972) (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges dismissed as moot after decision
of California supreme court in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1972), that capital punishment violated the state constitution); Maxwell v.
Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 141-48 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970)
(after thorough discussion, then Circuit Judge Blackmun rejected a Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge, based on the NAACP study of racial discrimination in rape sentencing,
note I supra, to a death sentence imposed under an Arkansas rape statute); Brief for
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. and National Office for the Rights of
the Indigent as Amici Curiae at 51-55, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (Eighth
Amendment challenge based in part on statistical evidence of racial discrimination in
imposition of death penalty).
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1972).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Two of the five Justices who concurred in the judgment of
the Court relied at least in part on statistical evidence of the racially discriminatory
imposition of the penalty. Id. at 250 n.15 (Douglas, J., concurring), 364-65 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Two of the dissenters recognized the importance of the evidence for a
possible claim of denial of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 389-90 n.12 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("data of more recent vintage" essential for equal protection claim), 449-50
(Powell, J., dissenting). See White, The Role of the Social Sciences in Determining the
Constitutionality of Capital Punishment, 13 DuQ. L. Rav. 279, 281-85 (1974).
4. State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803, cert. granted sub non. Fowler v. North
Carolina, 419 U.S. 963 (1974), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975), restored
for reargument, 422 U.S. 1039 (1975). See notes 17-18 infra.
Statistical Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment
teenth Amendment challenges to capital punishment imposed under North
Carolina's mandatory sentencing procedure.
Of the nine Justices writing separate opinions in Furman, Justice Mar-
shall, who along with Justice Brennan would have found the penalty
unconstitutional per se, gave the most weight to the statistical evidence
on deterrence.5 From prior cases construing the Eighth Amendment, he
derived the principle that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is
"excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose."6 Devoting more than
half of his discussion of the purposes conceivably served by capital pun-
ishment to the "hotly contested issue .. .whether it is better than life
imprisonment as a deterrent to crime,"7 he stated that the deterrent
effect of capital punishment rested on "logical hypotheses devoid of evi-
dentiary support," and invoked the statistical studies of Thorsten Sellin,
which for him "demonstrate that there is no correlation between the mur-
der rate and the presence or absence of the capital sanction." s He quoted
extensively from Sellin as "one of the leading authorities on capital punish-
ment" and included as appendixes to his opinion several of Sellin's tables
comparing homicide rates in neighboring abolitionist and retentionist
jurisdictions. 9 After considering and rejecting other possible purposes for
capital punishment, he concluded:
[T]he death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that
violates the Eighth Amendment. The statistical evidence is not con-
vincing beyond all doubt, but it is persuasive. . . . [T]here is suffi-
cient evidence available so that judges can determine, not whether the
legislature acted wisely, but whether it had any rational basis what-
soever for acting. Wvre have this evidence before us now. There is no
rational basis for concluding that capital punishment is not excessive.
It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment. 10
The "excessive and unnecessary" standard of the Eighth Amendment is
essentially equivalent to a substantive due process standard: the penalty
is unconstitutional if it lacks a rational basis." This due process analysis
5. 408 U.S. at 345-54 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that "the
available evidence uniformly indicates, although it does not conclusively prove, that the
threat of death has no greater deterrent effect than the threat of imprisonment." Id.
at 301. Justice Stewart found.the statistical evidence on deterrence "inconclusive." Id.
at 307-08 & n.7. Chief Justice Burger characterized the evidence on deterrence as an
,.empirical stalemate." Id. at 395. Justice Powell observed that statistical studies "tend
to support the view that the death penalty has not been proved to be a superior de-
terrent," but do not approach the showing required to find the penalty unconstitutional.
Id. at 454, 456. See White, supra note 3, at 285-88.
6. 408 U.S. at 331. This principle was also put forth by Justice Brennan, id. at
279-80, but was sharply attacked by the dissenters, id. at 391-96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The other ground relied on by Justices Brennan and Marshall was that the penalty
was "morally unacceptable to the people of the United States . Id. at 360 (Marshall,
J., concurring); see id. at 295-300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 345-54.
8. Id. at 347, 350.
9. Id. at 348-50, 373-74.
10. Id. at 358-59 (footnote omitted).
11. The principle that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is excessively severe
was suggested by Justice Goldberg's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v.
The Yale Law Journal
requires that those challenging the death penalty overcome the "presump-
tion of constitutionality accorded legislative acts."' 2 Whereas in a tradi-
tional Brandeis briefla statistical evidence is used to support that presump-
tion, in Furman the evidence was used to attack it.
If the Eighth Amendment does prohibit unnecessarily severe punish-
ments, the findings of Professor Isaac Ehrlich on the deterrent effect of capi-
tal punishment, reported a year after Furman and published this spring,
14
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), and analyzed as a substantive due process standard in
Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964). Justice
Marshall recognized that his excessive seerity principle under the Eighth Amendment
"parallels in some ways" a substantive due process analysis:
The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due process be-
come so close as to merge when the substantive due process argument is stated in
the following manner: because capital punishment deprives an individual of a fun-
damental right (i.e., the right to life), .. - the State needs a compelling interest to
justify it. .-. . Thus stated, the substantive due process argument reiterates what is
essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment-i.e., punishment may not be more severe than is necessary
to serve the legitimate interests of the State.
408 U.S. at 359-60 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring).
12. 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall did not make entirely clear his view of the strength of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality accorded to the legislative enactment of capital punishment.
On the one hand, he stated that those challenging the penalty "bear a heavy burden
of demonstrating that it is excessive," id. at 360 n.141, and on the other, that
[d]espite the fact that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and convincing evidence
that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent ....
Id. at 353.
In recent decades the Court has accorded a greater presumption to legislation restricting
economic liberty than to that restricting noneconomic rights. Compare Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963), Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), and G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-96 (9th ed. 1975) with Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and G. GUNTHER, supra
at 616-56. Following this double standard, the Court would apply the greater scrutiny to
punishments tested for a rational basis under the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Comment,
The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1268, 1271-73 (1968). It has been suggested
that the double standard may be justified by a theory of judicial review which accords
greater deference to legislation supported by instrumental policy considerations-reasons
of social utility-than to legislation supported by moral judgments. Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE
L.J. 222 (1973). Under this analysis, the legislative purpose of deterrence for capital
punishment might be subjected to less scrutiny than the other purpose most often
advanced-retribution. For discussions of retribution as a justification for capital punish-
ment, see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303-04 (Brennan, J., concurring), 308
(Stewart, J., concurring), 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring), 394-95 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
452-54 (Powell, J., dissenting) (1972); Packer, supra note 11, at 1078; Comment, supra at
1297-1301.
13. Before he was appointed to the Court, Louis Brandeis submitted a brief supplying
extensive factual support from nonjudicial sources for an Oregon law regulating hours
of work for women. His brief received favorable comment in Justice Brewer's opinion
for the Court upholding the statute, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-20 & n.l (1908),
and has become a classic example of the use of social science data in constitutional liti-
gation. See P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 86-92 (1949).
14. I. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life or
Death, 1973 (Working Paper No. 18, Center for Economic Analysis of Human Behavior
and Social Institutions); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Ques-
tion of Life or Death, 65 Amt. ECON. RFv. 397 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ehrlich 1975].
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bear importantly on the question now before the Court in Fowler. One of
the two Justices who have thus far revealed themselves willing to declare the
penalty unconstitutional per se has relied in large part on the statistical
research of Sellin and others who have followed his approach. Ehrlich
criticized the methods used by Sellin-graphical comparisons of homicide
rates in neighboring states-and used a more sophisticated technique-
multiple regression analysis.t5 He found a significant deterrent effect as-
sociated with the use of the death penalty in the United States over the
period from 1935 to 1969, specifically that on average for the period
studied each additional execution per year resulted in seven or eight fewer
murders.1 3 The Solicitor General of the United States, in his amicus brief
in Fowler, called attention to the Ehrlich study as important empirical
evidence that capital punishment serves the legitimate legislative purpose
of deterring murder;' 7 the petitioner, in his reply brief, sharply attacked
15. Multiple regression is a statistical technique for analyzing the relationship be-
tween a dependent variable, whose behavior is to be explained, and a set of inde-
pendent or explanatory variables. The analysis uses a sample of data to estimate an
equation in which the dependent variable is set equal to a weighted sum of the ex-
planatory variables. The weights or "coefficients" associated with the explanatory
variables are chosen to minimize the sum of the squared differences between the actual
values of the dependent variable and the values computed using the regression equation
(hence the term "least squares regression"). A graphical representation of a regression
equation with only one explanatory variable would be a "least squares" line drawn
through the scatter of points generated by plotting the dependent variablq on the
%ertical axis and the explanatory variable on the horizontal axis. Econometrics is con-
cerned with the use of regression analysis to measure and test economic relationships.
See R. WONAco-T 8: T. WONNACOT-r, ECONO.iETRics 1-9 (1970); Finkelstein, Regression
Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442, 1444-55 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Regression Models].
Regression analysis is being used with increasing frequency in legal commentary. See,
e.g., Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls
and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973); Breyer & MacAvoy,
The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 941 (1973); Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1975); Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of
the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-
Komesar Debate, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1098 (1975); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in
Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REv. 387
(1975). However there has been little discussion in legal journals of the wide range of
results which regression studies of a given relationship may produce and the statistical
controversies which often arise between authors of these conflicting studies. But see
Regression Models, supra at 1455-75; Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts:
The Role of Social Science Evidence, 39 LAw & CONIEMP. PROB. 217, 228 (1975) (con-
flicting statistical evidence on effects of racial integration and compensatory education
programs on test scores of minority students). The economic literature reveals the ex-
tent of the disagreements provoked by econometric studies even of relationships on which
there is considerable theoretical agreement among economists. See, e.g., D. PATINKIN,
MONEY, INTrREsr, AND PRicEs 651-64 (2d ed. 1965); Jorgenson, Econometric Studies of
Investmnent Behavior: A Survey, 9 J. Ecox. LIT. 1111 (1971); Liviatan, Tests of the
Permanent-Income Hypothesis Based on a Reinterview Savings Survey, in READINGS IN
ECONOMIC STATISTxCS AND ECOxo.ErRics 253-83 (A. Zellner ed. 1968); Friedman, Note on
Nissan Liviatan's Paper, in id. at 283-87; Liviatan, A Reply, in id. at 287-90.
16. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 14, at 398, 414.
17. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 35-38. In the summary of his
argument, the Solicitor General described the Ehrlich study in these terms:
After performing a sophisticated regression analysis that analyzed the effects of many
independent -ariables, [the most recent study of the deterrent efficacy of the death
The Yale Law Journal
the conclusions of the study as "completely unfounded."1 If Ehrlich's
study is reliable, it may be difficult to claim that the death penalty is
"excessive and unnecessary" and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.
Because the technical merits of the Ehrlich study have thus become rele-
vant to an important constitutional adjudication, the Journal is publishing
what is essentially a statistical debate between Ehrlich and his critics.
In the first article, Messrs. Baldus and Cole defend Sellin and contend
that his technique is better than Ehrlich's regression method for testing
the deterrence hypothesis; in the second article, Messrs. Bowers and Pierce
argue that Ehrlich's data are fundamentally inadequate for the method
he uses and that no evidence of a deterrent effect is found when his
method is correctly applied. Professor Ehrlich then responds with meth-
odological and statistical arguments in support of his initial study and fur-
ther elaborates on the basic issues underlying his research. In the next
issue of the Journal, Professor Jon K. Peck 19 will comment on the debate
between Ehrlich and his critics.
The difficulties a court faces in attempting to arbitrate an "abstruse
statistical dispute" between parties to a litigation were forcefully noted
by Judge J. Skelly Wright in Hobson v. Hansen,20 a suit challenging dif-
ferent per-pupil expenditures among elementary schools in the District of
Columbia. Judge Wright commented on "the added difficulties which beset
the truth finding process when it is necessary to rely upon easily manipulat-
ed statistical analyses," and deplored the "overgrown garden of numbers
and charts and jargon" which he suggested had obscured the basic issues
in the suit.2 1 He added:
The reports by the experts-one noted economist plus assistants for
each side-are less helpful than they might have been for the simple
reason that they do not begin from a common data base, disagree
over crucial statistical assumptions, and reach different conclusions.
Having hired their respective experts, the lawyers in this case had a
basic responsibility, which they have not completely met, to put the
hard core statistical demonstrations into language which serious and
concerned laymen could, with effort, understand.22
The articles which follow attempt to meet this "basic responsibility" in
the context of the statistical debate over the deterrent effect of capital
punishment; to the extent it is not met, the Court must rely, as did Judge
Wright, "upon burden of proof, and upon straightforward moral and con-
stitutional arithmetic." 23
penalty] concluded that, over the past several decades, each execution actually carried
out deterred a significant number of murders. Other studies of the death penalty are
infected by serious analytical flaws, and so do not provide support for a contrary
conclusion.
Id. at 9.
18. Reply Brief for Petitioner, App. C at 4c. See Brief, supra at 19 n.31. Petitioner
submitted two statistical critiques of the Ehrlich study, id. Apps. C & E.
19. Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale University.
20. 327 F. Supp. 844, 851 (D.D.C. 1971).
21. Id. at 852, 859.
22. Id. at 859.
23. Id.
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These articles also illustrate the inherent vulnerability of complex sta-
tistical techniques to the adversary process. Any statistical analysis de-
pends on a variety of explicit and implicit assumptions which can be
challenged by opposing parties and on which experts may reasonably
differ2 4 Since courts generally have no expertise to resolve statistical dis-
putes, they will tend to ignore the evidence altogether once such a dispute
arises.2 5 The probative value of any study can be destroyed by raising a
large number of technically complex objections, which, if not sufficient
to disprove the results of the study, will at least undermine them to the
point where the decisionmaker refuses to rely on them. This process tends
toward Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the evidence on de-
terrence in Furman-an "empirical stalemate." 20 The usefulness of sta-
tistical analyses to the courts may depend on the development of procedures
to resolve the technical debates which seem inevitably to arise when such
studies are put before them.27
24. See, e.g., J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC MIETHODS 121-23 (2d ed. 1972) (mathematical
statement of assumptions needed for regression analysis).
25. Finkelstein has noted this tendency in administrative proceedings in which re-
gression studies have been introduced. Regression Models, supra note 15, at 1444. The
lack of success in the use of sophisticated statistical evidence in administrative proceedings
necessarily raises doubts about the chances for its success in litigation before the courts,
because agencies are likely to be both more able and more willing than courts to use
this evidence. An agency has a staff which can develop the expertise necessary to con-
struct an econometric model of a regulated industry. See, e.g., Khazzoom, The FPC
Staff's Econometric Model of Natural Gas Supply in the United States, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
M. Sci 51 (1971). In addition, statistical evidence often bears directly on the predictions
and policy decisions that the agency must make. For example, in a ratemaking proceeding,
the agency must forecast the effect of the proposed change in rates on demand and
supply in the regulated industry-a question which lends itself to econometric analysis.
The relevance of the statistical evidence to regulatory decisionmaking may therefore lead
agencies to encourage its use. See, e.g., Southern La. Area Rate Proceeding, 40 F.P.C. 530,
626 (1968), modified, 41 F.P.C. 301 (1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 950 (1970), quoted in Regression Models, supra at 1458; Madison Gas & Elec.
Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 49 (1974).
26. 408 U.S. 238, 395 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. Finkelstein, in Regression Models, supra note 15, at 1455-61, proposes that an ad-
ministrative agency decide in advance on the data to be used in regression studies put
before it in a given proceeding and that the agency require a party objecting to the
statistical analysis presented to demonstrate the numerical significance of its objections
or even to present a superior alternative analysis of the designated data. While possibly
quite useful, these procedures are not likely to be sufficient to yield what their proponent
describes as
a progression towards greater refinement and correctness in statistical methodology
which will not only be apparent to the decisionmaker, but which may also achieve
results meriting at least tacit agreement among experts.
Id. at 1466. Instead, each side, using high-speed computers, may be able to "mine" a
limited sample of data for results which support its hypothesis. See id. at 1449 n.27;
Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971) ("the studies by both experts
are tainted by a vice well known in the statistical trade-data shopping and scanning to
reach a preconceived result"). Although its implications have not been fully discussed, this
problem of "data-mining" has been recognized in economic journals. See, e.g., Jorgenson,
Hunter & Nadiri, The Predictive Performance of Econometric Models of Quarterly In-
vestment Behavior, 38 ECONOMEriucA 213-15 (1970).
